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    All presidents have been successful politicians at some time during their political career; yet 
all presidents have not been successful.  This work seeks to understand why presidents have, and 
have not, been able to carry their success from previous roles into their role as president of the 
United States.  I am interested in answering a simple question: What makes a president 
successful? 
To answer this question I consulted with established political scientists, who directed me to a 
body of scholarship dedicated to the presidency.  I studied these materials in the hopes of 
deriving a formula for presidential success.  In addition to researching into presidential theory, I 
also embarked upon a review of the presidents during the Modern Era.  By analyzing the 
presidents’ accomplishments and failures, while simultaneously conducting research on the 
different theories of presidential success, I was able to develop a framework for my theory that 
made use of the most compelling arguments.  I selected four presidents for the purposes of my 
research, and evaluated them against the theory I developed.  
In my preliminary research on the presidency, four scholars were constantly cited in articles 
and books about the presidency: James David Barber, Richard Neustadt, Clinton Rossiter, and 
Aaron Wildavsky.  Though each of these individuals offers important contributions to the 
scholarship about the presidency, which I have used to develop my thesis, I have elected to not 
include Aaron Wildavsky’s notable work The Two Presidencies.  Since Wildavsky’s argument is 
similar to that of Rossiter, I feel that my discussion of Rossiter is sufficient for the purpose of 
this research. 
I began my research by reviewing the works of the previously stated scholars.  It was my 
hope that by reading these materials I would come across particular traits or characteristics of 
successful presidents.  I expected to find qualities, such as intelligence or wisdom, to be 
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paramount to a president’s success, yet discovered that such attributes were not discussed.  
Instead, I came across a myriad of models for presidential success, ranging from a president’s 
character to his effectiveness in particular roles.  
In his notable book, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance In The White House, 
Barber makes use of three personality-based properties: character, world view, and style.  
According to Barber, “Character is the way the a President orients himself toward life.”1  As 
presidents tackle tough situations, character determines their emotional responses, including 
feelings of confidence or rushes of insecurity.  After character is Barber’s discussion on “world 
view,” which highlights the individuality of the president.  “World view consists of his 
[president’s] primary, politically relevant beliefs, particularly his conceptions of social causality, 
human nature, and the central moral conflicts of the time.”2  From this definition, world view can 
be understood as the president’s personal beliefs and values as they relate to the social 
institutions that surround him.  Lastly, Barber utilizes a variable he calls “style” to predict 
presidential success.  “Style is the President’s habitual way of performing his three political 
roles: rhetoric, personal relations, and homework.  Not to be confused with “stylishness,” 
charisma, or appearance, style is how the President goes about doing what the office requires 
him to do.”3  It is my understanding that style allows the individual to actively exhibit their 
character and world view.  Although Barber creates two other variables for coding presidents 
(power situation and climate of expectations), these variables seem to play a lesser role in 
Barber’s work than the personality-based traits, which fuel Barber’s argument for the character-
based classification of presidents.   
                                                
1 Barber, James David.  The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance In The White House, 4th 
Edition.  (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1993), 5. 
2 Ibid, 5. 
3 Ibid, 5. 
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Whereas James David Barber believes a president’s character traits serve as the most 
accurate predictor of success, Richard Neustadt argues that a president’s ability to influence his 
constituents is the primary contributor to a successful administration.  According to Neustadt, 
“His (president’s) strength or weakness, then, turns on his personal capacity to influence the 
conduct of the men who make up government.  His influence becomes the mark of leadership.  
To rate a President according to these rules, one looks into the man’s own capabilities as seeker 
and wielder of effective influence upon the other men involved in governing the country.”4  
Neustadt’s model of presidential power rests on the understanding that influence is derived from 
the president’s vantage points, powers afforded to him solely because of his unparalleled 
position.  Although Barber and Neustadt differ in their understanding of the derivations of 
presidential power, they share the view that success and effective rule are primarily correlated to 
the individual in office, rather than the situations the individual encounters.   
A third scholar, Clinton Rossiter, offers another explanation of presidential power.  In his 
book, The American Presidency, Rossiter recognizes the constitutional responsibilities of the 
president, yet also identifies additional responsibilities that have surfaced during the modern era, 
which include roles such as: Chief of Party, Voice of People, Protector of Peace, Manager of 
Prosperity, and World Leader.5  According to Rossiter, the president’s success is a product of 
both his performance of constitutionally mandated duties, and his performance in the acquired 
roles.  While his discussion of performance as it relates to success shares undertones with 
Neustadt’s argument, Rossiter’s explanation of the expanding responsibilities of the presidency 
helps to solidify the questionable logic in Neustadt’s work.  Whereas Neustadt fails to fully 
account for the significance of particular events or situations, Rossiter acknowledges the 
                                                
4 Neustadt, Richard.  Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership.  (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 
1960), 2. 
5 Rossiter, Clinton.  The American Presidency.  (The New American Library: New York, 1960), 28 – 36. 
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significance that events can have for the presidency.  In discussing the evolution of the 
president’s role in the legislative process, Rossiter claims: 
The role of the President as active participant in every stage of the legislative process is almost 
wholly the creation of three twentieth-century incumbents: Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow 
Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt.  Each came at a time when the state of the Union demanded 
that new laws be placed on the books; none was strangled by wearing the “old school tie” of either 
house of Congress.  The meeting of their forceful personalities with the crises of the age produced 
a revolution in the relations of the President to Congress and in the standards with which the 
American people rate his total performance.6 
 
The introduction of situational factors into the discussion of presidential power and success is an 
important development.  While Neustadt and Barber spend ample time discussing the role of 
personality and character, only Rossiter truly recognizes the significance of the situations in 
which presidents operate. 
 In analyzing the different theories of presidential power and success, all three scholars offer 
unique approaches.  By identifying character traits shared by the most successful presidents of 
the Modern Presidency, it is possible to understand what qualities are essential to success.  Yet 
during the process of identifying traits, it is important not to ignore the importance of the 
situation.  Throughout a president’s time in office there are a myriad of situations that occur and 
affect success; examples of situations include Vietnam, the Great Depression, and World War II.   
Therefore, I believe that a hybrid approach may offer a more insightful understanding of 
presidential success.  By recognizing that situations play a chief role in exposing and 
manipulating presidential traits, and identifying the particular traits that produce success, one can 
understand why a certain president is successful.   
 My research relates only to presidents who have served during the Modern Era, which is 
commonly defined as beginning with Franklin Roosevelt and lasting through present day.  The 
Modern Era offers a wide variety of characters and significant situations, and is of the most 
                                                
6 Ibid, 106. 
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relevance to the scholarly writings that I rely upon for my argument.  By approaching the 
presidents of the modern era with a model of success that incorporates both traits and situations, 
I have developed a list of characteristics that allow a president to operate successfully: adaptive 
leadership, communication, and citizen compassion. 
 
Introduction of Variables 
 Adaptive Leadership 
 The concept of adaptive leadership, the hallmark of successful administrations, refers to the 
president’s ability to adjust his direction or agenda depending on the current political or social 
climate.  Adaptive leaders are inherently fluid in that they avoid taking hard positions on issues 
prematurely.  Common among such individuals is a level of “outside-the-box” thinking, as they 
regularly behave in ways that alter the playing field to their advantage.  In this study I will argue 
that adaptive leadership is a necessary ingredient in the manufacturing of public support, which 
is vital for a successful administration.  To witness adaptive leadership, it is necessary for a 
situation to impose extraordinary circumstances, such as the depressed economy during the 
1930s, and presidents only practice adaptive leadership when a situation demands something 
more than the status quo.  Whereas all presidents are good leaders to some extent, in that they 
manage their cabinet and play a chief role in their political party, adaptive leadership dictates 
how well a president handles a difficult situation.  
 Citizen Compassion   
 Much like adaptive leadership, successful presidents also share a certain level of citizen 
compassion.  Citizen compassion can be defined as: an individual’s ability to relate to persons of 
another class, race, or group; it is the antithesis of the “Let them eat cake” mentality.  Despite 
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belonging to exclusive societies, the most successful presidents have been able to transcend 
socio-economic gaps and identify with the “common man.”   Although citizen compassion seems 
to be intertwined with the communication characteristic, citizen compassion deals with the 
president’s ability to receive or take in information, while the communication characteristic 
demonstrates the president’s ability to express himself and disseminate information. 
  Citizen compassion is relevant to a successful presidency because it can help attune the 
president to the needs of the average American citizen, which at times may be difficult to 
discern.  By demonstrating citizen compassion, presidents develop their legislative agendas 
accordingly, and ultimately create good policy.   From a situational standpoint, citizen 
compassion is an important characteristic of successful presidents because it allows them to 
obtain an accurate reading of public sentiment, particularly in times of uncertainty or disorder.  
In the midst of the Great Depression, Roosevelt demonstrated his sense of citizen compassion by 
recognizing in his first inaugural address that Americans were concerned with the state of the 
economy.  Furthermore, situations are relevant to citizen compassion in that they help dictate its 
effectiveness.  While Roosevelt’s citizen compassion helped him gain the public’s support 
during his first administration, he found himself out of favor several years later during his Court-
packing scheme, despite still being attuned to the public’s interests.     
   Communication Techniques and Capabilities 
The third determinant of presidential success, communication aptitude, is the most tangible 
characteristic of the group.  Presidents’ communication skills are constantly on display in the 
forms of speeches, letters, or press conferences.  Communication skills in themselves contribute 
to a president’s success, as they can help bring about desired results in Congress or with 
international diplomats.  However, in addition the obvious advantages of good communication, 
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such skills also play a major role in bringing adaptive leadership and citizen compassion to the 
forefront.  In the modern era, a president’s communication skills have allowed him to showcase 
his adaptive leadership and citizen compassion.   
 Unlike the other variables, situations do not seem to directly affect a president’s 
communication skills; instead, communication skills affect the situation.  In times of anarchy, 
communication skills can help calm the masses.  Yet the relationship between communication 
skills and situations is especially evident in times of controversy, when a president must explain 
why he is not at fault for a particular incident.  In such circumstances the power of 
communication, or more specifically persuasion, helps a president dodge culpability.  Reagan 
and Clinton are prime examples of how persuasion can control a situation, as both utilized their 
communication aptitudes to persuade the public to ignore, or look past certain affairs. 
Definition of Success   
 The independent variables in my research all contribute to my dependent variable: success. 
I have chosen to identify a successful president as an individual who served at least two elected 
terms in Office, left the presidency in good standing with the nation, and has been highly 
regarded by historians.  I also relied on presidential rankings conducted by The Wall Street 
Journal in 2005 and C-Span in 1999 to familiarize myself with the public’s opinion about the 
past presidents.7 
 With these variables, I consulted Fred Greenstein’s The Presidential Difference: Leadership 
Styles from Roosevelt to George W. Bush, which provided me with background information 
about the modern presidents.  I felt that  a comparative study of the presidents would be the most 
useful way of evaluating my theory, and decided to select two successful presidents and compare 
                                                
7 Accessed via http://www.opinionjournal.com/hail/rankings.html (WSJ) and 
http://www.americanpresidents.org/survey/ (C-SPAN). 
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them to two unsuccessful presidents.  Because relatively little has been written about Bill Clinton 
and George W. Bush, I immediately removed them from my domain.  Left with presidents 
Roosevelt through George H.W. Bush, I  relied upon my definition of success and the 
presidential rankings in order to select the two most successful presidents of the era: Franklin 
Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan.   
As for finding presidential failures to compare to my successful presidents,  I was somewhat 
more subjective.  In my initial research, I was faced with the dilemma of selecting two 
unsuccessful presidents from a pool of four: Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford, Lyndon Johnson, and 
Richard Nixon.  I used a similar approach for choosing my unsuccessful presidents, as I 
considered the amount of time spent in office, whether or not the president left the office in good 
standing with the nation, and the Wall Street Journal and CSPAN rankings.  While Carter, Ford, 
and Nixon were similar in these categories, Johnson differs somewhat in that he ranks notably 
higher than the other individuals in the presidential rankings.   Nevertheless, Johnson’s 
catastrophe in Vietnam, despite his immense political capital after the 1964 election, made him a 
very intriguing candidate, and ultimately influenced my decision to study him.  Left with the 
other three presidents, I chose Nixon.  In addition to serving in office for a longer period than 
both Carter and Ford, which would presumably allow for more evidence, Nixon left office in 
very poor standing with the nation.  Furthermore, I am interested in discovering why Nixon’s 
accomplishments in foreign policy were overshadowed by his mishaps.      
It should be noted that in providing evidence of the Presidents’ events and experiences, I 
have inevitably excluded a plethora of information from my discussion.   Nevertheless, I have 
concluded that the information I have provided is representative of the larger body of 
information that exists.  My selection of episodes is based largely on the amount of information 
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that has been written about each event.  I attempted to gauge the importance of a particular event 
by recognizing the amount of information that existed for that event, relative to the text devoted 
to other events.  An example of this methodology can be seen through my discussion of 
Roosevelt’s Court-packing and the exclusion of Roosevelt’s relationship with trade unions, as 
the literature dedicated to Roosevelt and the Court far exceeds the scholarship committed to 
Roosevelt and trade unions.        
I believe that this study will validate my argument that successful presidents require adaptive 
leadership, citizen compassion, and communication aptitude; I speculate that these characteristics 
are necessary but not sufficient for success.  Therefore, I will attempt to prove that in addition to 
my characteristics a situational element is also necessary for success. 
Franklin Roosevelt  
Franklin Roosevelt entered the presidency when America was at its darkest hour.  In holding the 
office for more than a decade, Roosevelt embodied what can be understood as a successful 
president. Greenstein offers insight into Roosevelt’s presidency, by saying: 
FDR provides a benchmark for his successors.  His soaring rhetoric roused imaginations and 
stirred souls.  He restored faith in a political system that Americans had few reasons to respect and 
rallied the nation and its allies in an epic conflict in which victory was by no means assured.  He 
dominated his times, defining the terms of politics at home and abroad.8 
 
According to Greenstein, Roosevelt’s presidency marked a new day in politics as the executive 
branch surpassed the legislative branch to become the dominant force in the federal government.  
Despite a myriad of issues ranging from the state of the economy to the growing overseas 
conflicts in Europe, Roosevelt held the nation together and guided America to an era of 
prosperity.  Yet Roosevelt’s presidency was not always as glorious as most remember it to be.  
Despite gaining power for the executive branch, Roosevelt at times encountered difficulty while 
                                                
8 Greenstein, Fred.  The Presidential Difference: Leadership Styles from Roosevelt to George W. Bush.  
(The Free Press: New York, 2000) 22. 
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ushering his legislative packages through Congress.  His battle against the Supreme Court 
provides a perfect example of adaptive leadership, as FDR devised a strategy to remove the 
Court’s blockade of New Deal legislation.   This display of adaptive leadership was surpassed 
only by FDR’s maneuverings during the 1940’s, as he rebuilt his tarnished public image and 
generated public support for World War II.  
 Adaptive Leadership 
 Roosevelt’s first hundred days in office offer a remarkable era in American history.  With 
public morale at a dismally low level, and with Congress unable to remedy the nation’s 
deteriorating state, Roosevelt found himself in a unique situation.  Recognizing FDR’s situation, 
James David Barber claims, “The national climate of expectations was such that Roosevelt could 
act nearly as he wished without arousing immediate counter-pressures.  And the power situation 
he enjoyed in Washington, with a Congress ready to whoop through bill after bill, posed little 
challenge to his character.”9  With the nation in a state of disarray, and the lack of congressional 
restraint, Roosevelt seized the opportunity by ushering a surplus of legislation through Congress 
during his first 100 days in office.  In his assessment of FDR’s presidency, Robert DiClerico 
states:  
The first hundred days of his administration were a bustle of activity, producing the greatest 
waterfall of legislation of any president in our history.  Especially notable among his legislative 
accomplishments during the initial period were the Farm Relief Act, Banking Act, Economy 
Bill, Securities Act, Federal Relief Act, Railway Reorganization Act, National Recovery Act, 
and Agricultural Adjustment Act.10 
 
Yet despite FDR’s initial successes in the passage of numerous bills, the effectiveness of FDR’s 
New Deal came to a halt in 1935, as the Supreme Court began to render New Deal legislation to 
be unconstitutional.   
                                                
9 Barber, 289. 
10 DiClerico, Robert.  The American Presidency, 5th Edition.  (Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River: 2000), 
324. 
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 After nearly two years of unchecked power, the Supreme Court struck down a portion of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act, claiming that the a section of the bill unconstitutionally 
delegated legislative power to the President.  Writing for the majority of the 8-1 decision, Justice 
Hughes stated: 
To hold that he [President] is free to select as he chooses from the many and various objects 
generally described in the first section, and then to act without making any finding with respect 
to any object that he does select, and the circumstances properly related to that object, would be 
in effect to make the conditions inoperative and to invest him with an uncontrolled legislative 
power.11   
 
The ruling marked the first questioning of FDR’s authority, and served as a turning point in 
FDR’s administration.  Shortly after the decision in Panama Refining Co., Roosevelt 
experienced similar defeats with other New Deal bills as the Court struck down legislation 
including the Railroad Pension Act, Farm Mortgage Law, Agricultural Adjustment Act, and 
Bituminous Coal Act.12   
The transition from FDR’s complete authority to his constant failures is rather difficult to 
comprehend. In the time span between March of 1933 when he took office, and January of 1935 
when the Panama Refining Co. decision was handed down, FDR’s clout plummeted 
dramatically. Robert Cushman describes FDR’s decline in authority as a product of the changing 
social environment. 
A despairing and bewildered country accepted the new legislation at its face value, or the value 
placed on it by the Administration, politics and opposition were "adjourned," and most of those 
who discussed the constitutionality of what was being done were inclined to feel that in a great 
national crisis the measures necessary to national self-preservation must surely fall within the 
proper ranges of governmental authority. The Court, however, was spared the necessity of 
determining the validity of the Recovery program in the tense atmosphere of national crisis. 
After the lapse of two years, the depression showed some signs of abatement, political 
opposition had revived, and a public opinion which had somewhat uncritically accepted the 
New Deal as the only shelter in time of storm had begun to show itself in numerous quarters 
decidedly skeptical. The Court, therefore, was placed in the position of examining the recovery 
measures in 1935 in the much more normal atmosphere of two-sided debate.13 
                                                
11 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) 
12 DiClerico, 325. 
13 Cushman, Robert E. Constitutional Law in 1934-35: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court  
of the United States in the October Term, 1934. (The American Political Science Review. Vol. 30, No. 1. 
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As stated earlier, the Court’s examination of New Deal legislation proved to be damaging to 
Roosevelt’s quest for reform.  “By handing down a series of decisions disrupting the New Deal, 
the high court had made itself the bane of FDR’s existence.”14  Faced with the predicament of 
amending his legislation and risking the chance of further defeat, Roosevelt instead elected to 
alter the playing field by proposing an alteration in the federal judiciary.  The episode of FDR’s 
defeat at the hands of the Court provides for an impressive display of adaptive leadership; 
Roosevelt departed from his original agenda of reform in the hopes of conquering the obstacle 
that had thus far hindered his progress. Though the idea of radically changing the makeup of the 
judiciary appears to be a bold, if not radical scheme, it must be viewed in the context of 
Roosevelt’s environment in March of 1937, when he first publicly discussed increasing the size 
of the judiciary.15 
 Following Roosevelt’s successful bid in 1936, during which he humiliated his opponent Alf 
Landon by carrying 528 of the possible 536 electoral votes, he began his second term in office 
with the promise to continue along the path traveled during the last administration.  Despite 
acknowledging the increase in public morale, Roosevelt recognized the need for continued 
efforts.16  Suspecting that more legislation would be required to remove the social ills still 
plaguing U.S. citizens, Roosevelt set out to reform the Supreme Court.  In his account of FDR’s 
decision, DiClerico explains: 
He took the brash step of proposing legislation to Congress that would permit the president to 
add an additional member to the Supreme Court for every judge who reached the age of 
seventy and did not avail himself of the opportunity to retire.  Since there were six judges who 
                                                                                                                                            
Feb., 1936), 51-89. 
14 Shogan, Robert.  Backlash: The Killing of the New Deal.  (Ivan R. Dee: Chicago, 2006), 9. 
15 Barber, 297. 
16 Roosevelt, Franklin D.  Second Inaugural Address. Presented: Jan. 20, 1937.  (After recognizing the 
administration’s progress, Roosevelt proceeded to identify individuals that required further attention from 
the government.  See stanzas 24 – 28) 
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fell into this category, Roosevelt would be able to add six additional members and thus break 
the conservative hold on the Court.17  
 
By many accounts, Roosevelt’s scheme was doomed from the start.  Upon presenting the bill to 
the highest-ranking officials in his party, FDR received only lackluster support.  Venturing past 
the party members’ unwillingness to embrace the bill, FDR also encountered opposition with the 
American public. “The mail pouring into congressional offices was running 9 to 1 against the 
plan and increasing in volume.”18  FDR had made a gross miscalculation, and his mistake led 
many to question New Deal policy.  FDR’s Senate Resolution 1392, more commonly referred to 
as “A Bill to Reorganize the Judicial Branch of the Government”, was eventually signed into law 
on August 26, 1937, yet not before all attempts to overhaul the Court had been stricken from the 
bill.19  In addition to weakening his public image, the saga proved to be detrimental to the 
Democratic Party, as the bill’s vote exposed a wealth of uncertainty among Democratic senators. 
 Roosevelt’s court-packing disaster splintered the Democratic Party and left his political 
future uncertain.  However, late in the 1930s Roosevelt found himself at the forefront of an 
international crisis, which inevitably provided him with the support necessary to continue as 
president.  Author Robert Divine describes the episode with great detail in his book, Roosevelt 
and World War II.  According to Divine,  
The approach of the Second World War came almost as a godsend for Roosevelt the politician.  
Facing a hostile coalition in Congress and unable to extend the New Deal, the President 
seemed destined for retirement at the end of his second term as a man who had served well but 
lost his touch.  The war gave him a second chance as the people turned to his trusted leadership 
in the face of a new and complex challenge.20 
 
To understand how Roosevelt succeeded in regaining the public’s support, it is necessary to 
examine the events that occurred prior World War II.  Reviewing Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 
                                                
17 DiClerico, 325. 
18 Shogan, 123. 
19 Ibid, 219. 
20 Divine, Robert.  Roosevelt and World War II.  (The Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1969), 3. 
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1935, and paying close attention to Roosevelt’s involvement in the event, provides an example of 
adaptive leadership.   
 Upon arriving in office, Roosevelt refused to develop an elaborate foreign policy.  In the 
midst of the Great Depression, Roosevelt instead decided to focus solely on improving domestic 
issues.  In discussing Roosevelt’s agenda, Divine states, “His major desires in the mid-thirties 
were to achieve recovery and carry out sweeping domestic reforms; he could not jeopardize these 
vital goals with an unpopular foreign policy.”21  With his effort spent resolving the ailments of 
the Depression, Roosevelt accepted popular sentiment by supporting isolationist policy, which 
had become increasingly popular since the end of World War I.  According to John Wiltz, the 
public’s demand for isolationism was the product of a newly developed perception of war.  
Whereas war had seemed valiant in previous years, American society during the 1920s and 
1930s viewed war as a repulsive convention.  Speaking on behalf of popular sentiment during the 
era, Wiltz states, “Reflecting on war, people in the years after 1918 were not inclined to envision 
cavalry charges with banners flying and sabers flashing.  They saw mud, barbed wire, fear, 
desolation, death.”22  With popular sentiment supporting isolationism, Roosevelt was forced to 
comply with the public’s demands.  Yet as the threat of war developed during the 1930s, FDR 
slowly developed a hawkish position, bringing the nation closer to the battlefield.   
 In Roosevelt’s first term Germany and Italy became increasingly hostile nations.  Yet despite 
their antagonism against other European nations, Roosevelt declined to denounce their 
behaviors.  Yet in October of 1935, Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia caused Roosevelt to develop a 
foreign policy platform, which by most accounts hindered Italy’s aggressive behavior.  Invoking 
                                                
21 Ibid, 6. 
22 Wiltz, John E. From Isolation to War, 1931 – 1941. (Thomas Y. Crowell company: New York, 1968), 
10. 
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the recently passed Neutrality Act, Roosevelt instituted an arms embargo with both nations.23  
Along with the trade embargo, Roosevelt issued a final statement that discouraged Americans 
from participating in trade of any kind with the warring nations, which would come to be known 
as Roosevelt’s moral embargo.24  The moral embargo provides a prime example of adaptive 
leadership, as FDR used his political prowess to handle the delicate situation.  Roosevelt’s moral 
embargo appealed to the American public’s pathos in an attempt to thwart Italy’s invasion.  By 
identifying the moral implications of aiding an aggressor, Roosevelt denounced those who profit 
would from war, and shaped the international dilemma into a humanitarian issue.  Ultimately, 
Roosevelt’s actions enabled him to influence the situation, while still maintaining an isolationist 
platform.   
 Citizen Compassion 
As the threat of war became increasingly likely, the American public slowly reconciled their 
problems with Roosevelt.  In the face of danger many Americans rallied around FDR, affording 
him a sense of confidence that few presidents have enjoyed.  The public’s continued support for 
their chief executive is likely the product of Roosevelt’s unyielding citizen compassion.  During 
his time in office, Roosevelt developed a close relationship with the public, which he constantly 
sought to improve upon.  In The People and the President, authors Lawrence and Cornelia 
Levine discuss Roosevelt’s relationship with the public.   
FDR transformed the role of the federal government and the nature of the presidency.  He was 
more exposed to and better known by the American people than any of his predecessors . . . 
among the many profound changes he presided over was what constituted a revolution in the 
pattern of communication between Americans and their Chief Executive.25 
 
While Roosevelt’s communication transformation can be understood as an effort to better 
express his ideas to the electorate, his desire to revolutionize the relationship between the 
                                                
23 Divine, 11. 
24 The phrase moral embargo is shared by several scholars, including Divine and Wiltz.   
25 Levine, Cornelia & Lawrence.  The People and the President. (Beacon Press: Boston, 2002), X. 
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Executive branch and the public must be explained through Roosevelt’s upbringing and his 
social status.     
Franklin Roosevelt was born into a wealthy family and spent the majority of adolescence in 
Hyde Park, a suburban area located near New York City.  Although he belonged to a privileged 
class, Roosevelt’s parents constantly reminded him of his civic duty.  Scholar Robert McElvaine 
comments that, “From an early age FDR was taught that those who enjoy privilege must be 
willing to give back to the community, and that people of wealth, especially large land holders, 
should practice stewardship – conserve the land and other resources for future generations and 
help improve conditions for the poorer residents in their area.”26  In addition to the lessons 
received from his parents, Roosevelt received further guidance while at Groton School.   
Groton was another sheltered world, but one in which well-born boys were exposed to the 
problems of the larger world.  Under the tutelage of headmaster Endicott Peabody, Roosevelt 
and his schoolmates were groomed to be leaders, encouraged to be active, and taught that their 
duty was to work to rectify social ills.27 
 
Since Roosevelt’s adolescence filled with lessons pertaining to his civic responsibility, it comes 
as no surprise that Roosevelt built his political career on bettering the lives of disenfranchised 
people.  Biographer Frank Freidel claims, “Roosevelt, ever since he had first campaigned for the 
New York State Senate in 1910, had proclaimed himself in politics as the friend of the farmer.”28  
Roosevelt’s New Deal also reflects his desire to help the less fortunate, as the majority of New 
Deal legislation was aimed at providing relief to farm, rail, and factory workers.  But despite the 
desire to help others, initially Roosevelt lacked the means necessary to communicate with the 
American public.  Roosevelt’s innovative communication techniques helped resolve this 
conundrum, as the President employed various methods to obtain and disseminate information.  
                                                
26 McElvaine, Robert.  Franklin Delano Roosevelt. (CQ Press: Washington, D.C., 2002), 16.  
27 Ibid, 17 
28 Freidel, Frank.  Franklin D. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal.  (Little, Brown and Company: Boston 
& Toronto, 1973) 86. 
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Communication Techniques and Capabilities 
Franklin Roosevelt’s communication skills allowed him to revolutionize the executive office, 
as he reached out to the public and foreign leaders in ways never before done.  His innovative 
strategies helped him gain support for his agenda and did wonders for his public image.  Of the 
numerous communication schemes employed during his tenure in office, Roosevelt is perhaps 
most well known for his Fireside Chat.   
 In order to sell his New Deal agenda, Roosevelt addressed the public through Fireside Chats.  
With radio serving as the primary medium of entertainment during the early 1930s, Roosevelt 
took his message of reform to the airways and was widely received by the American public.  
Much of the success came from FDR’s desire to express his thoughts directly to the public, 
rather than allow his words to trickle from his mouth, to the media, and then eventually the 
public.  “As a number of scholars have observed, the written word was increasingly replaced by 
the spoken word.  Radio certainly stimulated the rise of what has been called the “rhetorical 
presidency,” in which FDR used his speeches as “events” in and of themselves in an attempt to 
communicate with the public over the heads of the legislature and the newspapers.”29  By 
removing the barriers between which had previously existed between the American electorate 
and the federal government, FDR developed a strong relationship with the public.  The myriad of 
letters he received during his presidency, many of them in response to his Fireside Chats, 
demonstrate the strength of his bond with the public.     
 Although creating considerable strain on his staff, during his Fireside Chats FDR encouraged 
his listeners to send letters to the White House.  “When in the midst of one address Roosevelt 
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invited his audience to “tell me your troubles,” Ira Smith, the White House Chief of Mails, 
testified that large numbers of people “believed that he was speaking to them personally and 
immediately wrote him a letter.”30  FDR’s encouragement created the largest influx of mail to the 
White House in its history; the White House mail staff labored through the roughly 5,000 letters 
that arrived each day.31  Although the letters created an incredible burden on the White House 
mail staff, they provided the administration with a clear channel of public opinion.  “FDR 
especially valued these letters because, as he informed his adviser Louis Howe, who supervised 
the President’s correspondence both before and directly after he became President, personal mail 
from everyday folks, who tended to express their convictions honestly, constituted the ‘most 
perfect index to the state of mind of the people’.”32  Recognizing the value in receiving the 
letters, FDR regularly encouraged his listeners to continue writing letters.    
The constant flow of mail into the White House was largely supported by the personalized 
response which nearly every letter received.  Although only a handful of the mail made it as far 
as FDR’s desk, each letter received a customized response, according to author Leila A. 
Sussmann.  “Undaunted by the greatest deluge of letters ever seen in the White House, the staff 
did not budge from their long standing principle: a personal letter to FDR, no matter from whom 
it came, deserved a careful, prompt and individual reply.”33 The carefully worded responses 
played an integral part in the development of FDR’s public image, as a majority of the public 
was convinced that FDR had personally written each reply.  Furthermore, the responses fostered 
confidence in the federal government and the executive for citizens suffering from the Great 
Depression.  
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While Roosevelt used his Fireside Chats to gain the support of the public, he also made use 
of the media to further his agenda.  Scholar Michael Carew claims that, upon entering office, 
FDR had a wealth of experience with the media.  “More than any prior president, Franklin 
Roosevelt had broad experience with what is now called the communications media.  He had 
worked at his college daily newspaper, the Harvard Crimson, rising to editor and president in his 
senior year.”34  With a strong understanding for the industry FDR utilized print media to express 
his policy ideas and further develop public support.  This is most apparent in Roosevelt’s selling 
of the war, where he made a plethora of public statements that hinted at his desire to enter the 
war, or at the very least aid European allies.   
When Roosevelt first spoke out publicly against the actions of Germany and Italy, his words 
were well documented by the print media and communicated both to the American public and 
foreign leaders.  With the help of numerous newsmagazine editors, with whom he enjoyed close 
relationships, Roosevelt utilized print media to advance his foreign policy agenda.35  In his 
famous “Saturday surprise,” Roosevelt denounced the aggressions in Europe and requested that 
Hitler and Mussolini not attack the 31 U.S. ally nations in the region.  In return for their 
compliance, Germany and Italy would receive trading preference with the U.S.  Although subtle 
in his appeal, Roosevelt’s strategic communication “put Hitler and Mussolini on the spot for 
what they were.”36  By offering to utilize political means to solve the growing crisis in Europe, 
Roosevelt appeared as a diplomat, rather than a president anxious to enter the war.  Wiltz claims 
that, “Roosevelt roused the American people to the imminence of danger, stigmatized the 
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dictators as perpetrators of international discord, and heartened non-Axis countries in Europe.”37  
Through his well-planned communication, Roosevelt occupied a position that helped gain public 
support, while allowing him to further his policy initiative. 
Conclusion     
Despite numerous setbacks with the Supreme Court and the Court-packing disaster, Franklin 
Roosevelt is remembered as a valiant, courageous, and successful president.  I believe that much 
of Roosevelt’s success is attributable to his satisfying of my three criteria.  By practicing 
adaptive leadership, citizen compassion, and strategic communication, Roosevelt endured 
countless impediments, yet emerged victorious.   
Ronald Reagan 
As the son of middle class Americans, Ronald Reagan was not born into the upper echelons 
of society like the vast majority of presidents.  Growing up in Illinois, Nixon attended public 
schools and after graduating from high school went on to study at nearby Eureka College.  After 
college, Reagan made a living as a sports announcer for a local radio station and eventually 
signed a contract to act in films for Warner Brothers.  Reagan enjoyed moderate success in 
Hollywood, acting in a host of “B level” movies.  Reagan’s prominence catapulted him to the 
head of the Screen Actors Guild, where he would serve as the organization’s president.  After 
Hollywood, Reagan went on to work for General Electric as a company spokesman.  Although 
Reagan began his career as a liberal, voting for Franklin Roosevelt four times, during his public 
career Reagan evolved into a dedicated conservative.38  In 1966 Reagan campaigned for and won 
the California governorship, where he served for eight years before entering the presidential race 
of 1976.  After a narrow defeat from Gerald Ford, Reagan momentarily retreated from the 
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political arena, opting instead to host a nationally broadcast radio show.  Four years after losing 
the Republican nomination for president to Ford, Reagan entered the White House as the 
nation’s 40th president. 
Ronald Reagan was a successful president because, although he entered office amidst a 
monetary crisis and a dismally low public morale, upon completion of his second term the nation 
had experienced an economic boom and a dramatic increase in confidence.  Reagan was the first 
president to serve two full terms in more than 30 years and helped restore national pride and 
patriotism.  In addition to these intangible achievements, Reagan also made a lasting 
accomplishment by bringing about an end to the Cold War.  While his predecessors constantly 
attempted to combat the Cold War, either through diplomatic relations or military buildup, it was 
during Reagan’s presidency that the Cold War finally began to wilt away.  In achieving success 
during his presidency, Reagan exhibited adaptive leadership and citizen compassion yet relied 
primarily on his communication aptitudes.      
 Adaptive Leadership 
To make good on his campaign promise of strengthening the armed services, Ronald Reagan 
embarked on a host of initiatives aimed at achieving military superiority.  On March 23, 1983, 
Reagan addressed the nation to offer his reasoning for increased defense spending.  According to 
Reagan, “We had to move immediately to improve the basic readiness and staying power of our 
conventional forces, so they could meet--and therefore help deter--a crisis. We had to make up 
for lost years of investment by moving forward with a long-term plan to prepare our forces to 
counter the military capabilities our adversaries were developing for the future.”39 Although his 
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“investment” plans were met with mixed feelings, Reagan’s missile defense plan encountered 
widespread skepticism.  
Missile defense had become a major concern to Reagan and the Pentagon after the Soviet 
Premier publicly acknowledged the Soviet Union’s nuclear capabilities.  According to author 
Walter LaFeber, “In November 1983 Andropov announced that Soviet submarines carrying 
nuclear weapons were now deployed in larger numbers closer to U.S. coasts.  Their missiles 
could hit U.S. targets in less than ten minutes after launch.”40  After weighing the significance of 
Andropov’s claims, Reagan set forth with his notorious Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).  
Commonly referred to as Star Wars, SDI relied upon high intensity lasers, stationed on satellites 
orbiting the earth, to destroy incoming missiles.41  Almost immediately after its introduction, 
scientists began to identify the loopholes of the proposed defense initiative.  “The plan depended 
on technology that lay far into the future.  Indeed, according to many scientists who studied and 
objected to the plan, it was based on technology that would never be possible, although the futile 
quest for it could be unimaginably expensive and dangerously destabilizing for both the 
American economy and U.S. Soviet relations.”42  Furthermore, the problems associated with 
testing the defense system offered further limitations to Reagan’s proposal.  In their article 
against the SDI, Jerome Slater and David Goldfischer argued: 
Even if the various exotic technologies currently being explored by the United States (as well as 
by the Soviet Union) – supercomputers, software programs of unprecedented complexity, orbiting 
space stations, lasers or particle-beam weapons, etc. – prove to be feasible in principle, which is by 
no means assured, there would still be perhaps insoluble operational problems of joining the 
various technologies together into a complex weapons system that would have to work in near-
perfect fashion the first time it was actually used in battle.43  
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While the science community was hesitant to embrace the President’s answer to Soviet nuclear 
capabilities, members of the social science community were largely against the idea of 
embarking upon a new chapter in the development of nuclear weaponry. 
 Although the vision of a nuclear-safe nation was intriguing, many philosophers and political 
scientists expressed disapproval of the Strategic Defense Initiative.  Claiming that such an 
initiative would lead to universal military build-up, some scholars went so far as to state that SDI 
would compromise the nation’s safety.  In an article published in late 1984, Sidney Drell 
asserted, “The initiation of an intensified R&D program looking towards a declared goal is not a 
harmless step.  Even if no system is ever deployed, increased instability can result as both sides 
build up their forces over necessarily long lead times to preserve their retaliatory capability and 
try to match each other’s anticipated ABM capability.”44  Convinced that such a program would 
bring about more harm than good, an impressive number of social scientists spoke out against 
SDI.  While at the time such complaints were in large part ignored by the Reagan administration, 
during an interview in 1995 former National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane acknowledged 
the compromising situation brought on by the introduction of Star Wars.  According to 
McFarlane, “With SDI we seemed to suggest that the United States wanted to have first-strike 
capability.  If you protect your own people and don’t have to worry about getting hit, it is safe 
for you to attack them.  If it looks that way in the Kremlin, won’t they attack you before you get 
SDI built?  So you are making the world a much less stable place.”45  The former security 
advisor’s admission, along with the abundance of criticism from the academic community, 
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suggests that SDI was terminally flawed, as the potential gains in safety were surpassed by the 
associated dangers of Soviet retaliation.   
 Despite grave concerns from professional communities, Reagan continued to pursue the 
Strategic Defense Initiative throughout the remainder of his first term and well into his second 
term, as evinced by Reykjavik.  In 1986, Reagan met with Mikhail Gorbachev at Reykjavik to 
discuss nuclear bans and disarmament, yet failed to reach an agreement after refusing to do away 
with the Strategic Defense Initiative.  The inability to secure a meaningful agreement dealt a 
major blow to Reagan and SDI.  As author Peter Wallison recounts, “Returning to the United 
States, Reagan was greeted with a barrage of complaints for allowing SDI – which was, after all, 
only an unproven concept – to stand in the way of a significant disarmament agreement.”46  
Along with the complaints, Reagan was also faced with a public that had become increasingly 
hostile to SDI.   
 Initially, the American public initially supported SDI.  In a joint survey conducted by CBS 
and The New York Times in April 1983, 67% of respondents supported research and development 
of an anti-nuclear missile shield over the United States.47  Yet after two years of waiting, and 
relatively little evidence that such a program would prove successful, the public’s opinion began 
to shift.  In March 1985, a Harris poll revealed that 56% of respondents were opposed to 
developing a defense system that relied upon lasers.48  With lasers constituting a major element 
of SDI, the survey results can be interpreted as a clear departure from the public’s widespread 
support only two years earlier. 
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 With the Strategic Defense Initiative, and for that matter Reagan’s hawkish disposition, 
coming under extreme fire from scholars and the general public, Reagan embarked upon a new 
path in his foreign policy.  Since his arrival in office, Reagan had cautiously observed the Soviet 
Union and done much to prepare for a possible conflict between the United States and the 
U.S.S.R.  During his first term, such preparations involved massive military spending and the 
development of more advanced and destructive weaponry.  Yet at the start of Reagan’s second 
term the U.S.S.R. faced an economic crisis, which presented an opportunity for Reagan to shift 
his foreign policy and strive for a more diplomatic relationship with the Soviets.  Recognizing 
that disarmament would reduce the Soviet threat, Reagan began his quest to rid the world of 
nuclear weapons.  Mindful of his critics and the dwindling support of the public for SDI, Reagan 
used the economic crisis to change from a policy of military superiority to one of diplomacy.   
 In the mid 1980s, the Soviet Union experienced several years of economic contraction.  
According to author John Arquilla, most of the economic misfortune was the result of 
government corruption and inefficiency.  “The Soviets had been busily contributing to their own 
economic problems.  First there was the matter of high-level party corruption, which saw vast 
sums skimmed off by key members of the ruling elite . . . In addition to the corruption, though, 
there were even greater costs and inefficiencies associated with the existing Soviet bureaucracy’s 
wasteful processes.”49  With the possibility of reducing military costs, the Soviets were eager to 
work with the U.S. to reach arms agreements.   
 But while the economic downtrend served as a catalyst for change, it should not overshadow 
the importance of Reagan’s decision to change course at the beginning of his second term.  
Reagan’s choice to pursue diplomacy offers an exemplary display of adaptive leadership, as he 
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maneuvered around past grievances to accomplish major disarmament treaties.  Although it was 
not until Reagan’s third meeting with Soviet Premier Gorbachev in December of 1987 that the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) was signed, Reagan’s adaptive leadership 
allowed him to undo over 40 years of hostilities between the two nations and to produce a 
concrete disarmament agreement.50   
 
 
Citizen Compassion 
 Ronald Reagan entered office at a time when the public had nearly lost confidence in the 
federal government.  The ever-rising unemployment and inflation rates, coupled with the highly 
publicized Iranian Hostage Crisis, were continuous testaments to the Carter Administration’s 
ineffectiveness.  While campaigning, Reagan pledged to rid the nation of the host of problems 
that had plagued the Carter Administration, while restoring America’s greatness.  Michael Foley 
recounts the period by stating, “After four failed presidencies, the time seemed ripe for radical 
solutions, and the mantle of respectability – even necessity – attached itself to the right wing of 
the Republic party.”51  Reagan’s sense of citizen compassion allowed him to understand the 
ailing state of affairs and develop a platform focused on healing the nation.  Yet to understand 
how Reagan developed such a profound sense of citizen compassion, it is necessary to examine 
his background.   
Whereas Franklin Roosevelt enjoyed a privileged childhood, his successful counterpart 
Ronald Reagan experienced a less desirable situation.   Born into a modest, middle-class family 
in Illinois, Reagan was constantly on the move during his early years as his family relocated 
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several times during the first 10 years of Reagan’s life.  Author Adrianna Bosch captures 
Reagan’s childhood experience by saying, “From the age of four to the age of ten, Reagan lived 
the life of a nomad, every year a new school, a new town, neighbors and friends left behind.  The 
little boy had nowhere to go except within.”52  Reagan also differed from Roosevelt in that they 
were afforded extremely different fathers.  While Franklin’s father James had enjoyed much 
success in his business ventures, Ronald’s father Jack made his living selling shoes and never 
achieved the success he set out for.53  To make matters worse, Jack Reagan was well known for 
his alcoholism.  Yet despite Reagan’s dismal situation, he made a name for himself in the small 
community of Dixon, Illinois.  He excelled in extra-curricular activities, was popular among his 
peers, and upon graduation from high school went off to Eureka College. 
 Having come from humble upbringings, Reagan embodied the “average man”, and despite 
his positions in the entertainment industry and Corporate America, Reagan never forgot his 
roots.  Although his acting career had removed his middle-class status many years ago, upon 
campaigning for the presidency in 1979, Reagan acknowledged that he had not forgotten the 
“average man”.  He worked hard to win votes from traditionally Democratic voting blocs.  
“From the New Jersey waterfront, to a street in the Bronx, and a steel mill in Ohio, Reagan 
reached out to new constituencies – ethnic minorities working hard to “make it” in America, 
Catholics who supported his anti-abortion platform, and most important, blue-collar workers – 
who had traditionally voted Democrat.”54  When Reagan asked if the American public was better 
off than they were four years ago, such groups found themselves drifting away from Reagan’s 
opponent Carter, along with the Democratic Party. 
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 Given Reagan’s close ties to the middle class, it should come as no surprise that he 
demonstrated impressive citizen compassion, as evinced primarily by his policy agenda.  
According to Bosch, upon entering office “Reagan saw a troubled America – besieged by 
economic problems, losing grounds to an expansionist Soviet Union, suffering from a loss of 
confidence in itself and even in the very office he had just assumed.”55  To combat the nation’s 
ailments, Reagan proposed massive tax cuts and attempted to shrink government.  Whereas the 
origins of Roosevelt’s citizen compassion necessitated a deep investigation of his childhood and 
life experiences, the basis of Reagan’s citizen compassion is easily discernable.  Reagan was 
from a middle class family, had experienced the lifestyle of typical Americans in rural America, 
and never lost sight of his past.  Therefore, Reagan’s citizen compassion was the product of his 
years in Illinois, as the son of middle-class, uneducated Americans.   
Communication Techniques and Capabilities 
 
Commonly referred to as “The Great Communicator,” Ronald Reagan regularly displayed 
impressive negotiation, oratory, and written abilities during his time in office.  These skills were 
the fruits of Reagan’s labors throughout his professional career, which began nearly 50 years 
before he won the Presidency.  Such abilities allowed him to promote his political ideology, 
while also raising the public’s confidence and promoting a sense of national prosperity. 
Upon graduation from Eureka College, Reagan found work as a sports broadcaster for a 
small radio station in Iowa.  His broadcasting was well received and earned him modest notoriety 
in the entertainment industry.  Eventually, Reagan was given the opportunity to audition for 
Warner Brothers Studios and was offered a contract with the studio.56  While acting undoubtedly 
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helped Reagan become a better speaker, it was more significant because it paved his way to 
membership, and eventually leadership of, the Screen Actor’s Guild.  
Reagan joined the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) in 1937 and was the association’s president 
from 1947 – 1952 and 1959 – 60.57  Apart from serving as a major development in his political 
ideology, Reagan’s stint as president of SAG also introduced him to the art of negotiation.  
According to scholar Robert Collins, “Reagan’s SAG experience was formative in that it helped 
him become an unusually effective negotiator.  Throughout his subsequent political career 
Reagan relied on skills that he had developed in long Hollywood negotiating sessions with studio 
bosses on a variety of contentious work-related issues.”58  The skills Reagan developed while 
with SAG would prove to be of foremost assistance during his talks with Mikhail Gorbachev.   
Similar to negotiation, Reagan also excelled in public speaking.  Hired by General Electric to 
host a television program titled G.E. Theater, Reagan spoke to G.E. employees on behalf of the 
conglomerate.  “He traveled throughout the country to speak at General Electric offices and 
factories.  Reagan frequently acted in the program but he is best remembered as the program host 
and the pitchman for G.E., preaching the virtues of free enterprise.”59  During these stops Reagan 
perfected his public speaking talents, which were constantly exhibited throughout his political 
career.  A classic display of Reagan’s public speaking prowess occurred during the Republican 
National Convention in 1976, when Gerald Ford allowed Reagan to address the delegates.  John 
Patrick Diggens provides a vivid account for the evening. 
After he [Gerald Ford] had completed his acceptance speech and the applause had quieted 
down, Ford looked high up in the convention arena, where Reagan, Nancy and their team were 
seated in a skybox.  Ford beckoned with his arm for Reagan to come down and the crowd shouted, 
“Speech! Speech!”  When Reagan appeared at the podium and started to speak, the entire crowd 
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was standing.  Reagan had no prepared text, but he spoke like a prophet, reminding his audience 
that he would also be addressing “people a hundred years from now, who know all about us.”   
The crowd rejoiced, and when the applause died down murmurs could be heard coming from 
delegates who wondered if they had nominated the wrong person.60 
 
For the delegates less familiar with Reagan, his speech served to fortify his image.  Several years 
later when Reagan embarked on the campaign trail once again, he relied upon his rousing 
speaking style to capture potential voters.  According to Ronald Godwin of the Moral Majority,  
“He [Reagan] would give these tremendously inspiring speeches that had all the right rhetoric, 
that articulated the dreams, aspirations and values they [religious voters] cherished.”61  Reagan’s 
gift of oration proved to be an indispensable asset during his quest for the Presidency, allowing 
him to capture the attention of the masses and captivate his audiences. 
 While Reagan was well known for his negotiating and public speaking abilities, he was a 
powerful writer as well, which was manifested through his speeches and letters.  According to 
author Martin Anderson, “He [Reagan] was a tremendous writer.  In the early days of the 
campaign, he wrote all his own speeches.”62  As with his speeches, Reagan also preferred to 
write his own letters.  Reagan’s letters came in two varieties: letters to constituents and friends, 
and letters to foreign leaders.  Recounting his time with President Reagan, Peter Wallison was 
astonished when he discovered that the President wrote personalized responses to the letters he 
received.  “What amazed me, however, was that the President was writing his own responses to 
these letters – that at least in these cases the correspondents were getting real things and not the 
perfunctory response of a programmed assistant in the White House Correspondence Unit.”63  
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Through his letters, Reagan maintained an open line of communication with the American 
public, allowing them direct access to the Executive Branch for the first time in several decades.   
 Examples of Reagan’s letter writing are also evident in his communication with Soviet 
Leaders.  While recovering from his assassination attempt, Reagan drafted a letter to then Soviet 
leader Leonid Brezhnev.  Reagan’s policy advisors and speechwriters reviewed the President’s 
draft, making numerous edits, which eventually led to the creation of an entirely new document.  
Upon receiving the new letter, Reagan elected to ignore his advisors’ corrections and send his 
original work.  In discussing the letter, Diggens writes, “It was a thoughtful document that tried 
to get to the bottom of the dangerous distrust the United States and the USSR had toward one 
another.”64  Although the letter failed to secure the diplomatic relationship Reagan was hoping to 
establish, the document provided insight into Reagan’s unique ability to communicate through 
writing. 
 While Reagan regularly utilized a variety of communication mediums, he exuded feelings of 
prosperity, and reverence in virtually all of his actions.  Beginning with his inauguration, Reagan 
took steps to rebuild the glory of the presidency.   
 Reagan’s inaugural festivities were intended to convey a mood of renewal and optimism. At 
an estimated cost of $8 million, the three-day extravaganza began with a $800,000 fireworks 
display at the Lincoln Memorial followed by two nights of show-business performances including 
Frank Sinatra, Jimmy Stewart, Rich Little and Johnny Carson.  Three tons of jellybeans – 
Reagan’s favorite candy – were flown in.  At $2,000 per night limousines had to be brought in 
from as far away as Atlanta, to ferry around the movie stars, millionaire Californians and 
conservative Midwesterners who had descended on the capital to celebrate in style.65 
 
The inauguration set the stage for a new era in America, as Reagan constantly attempted to 
exhibit American prosperity.  Believing that the Executive Branch was an integral part of the 
nation’s prosperity, Reagan went out of his way to demonstrate respect for the Office.  
According to Wallison, “As always in the Oval Office, the President was impeccably dressed in 
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a business suit.  It is now well known that, out of respect for the office, Reagan never took off his 
suit jacket while there.”66   Reagan’s exhibition of prosperity and reverence were important 
factors in his ability to inspire the public, and his effort helped rebuild the presidential mystique.   
Through his actions Reagan also communicated a sense of heroism, which was most evinced 
through his behavior shortly after his assignation attempt.  On March 30, 1981, John Hinckley 
attempted to assassinate Ronald Reagan outside the Washington Hilton Hotel.67  Although 
Reagan narrowly escaped death, the elderly president showed impressive exuberance, leaving the 
hospital less than two weeks after the failed assassination.68  The episode provided to be a major 
boost in support for Reagan, as “his record-setting tax cuts were passed, and his heroic image 
during the crisis was solidified in the imagination of the American people.”69  So while Reagan 
possessed superior communication abilities, his effectiveness as a communicator was also 
supported by the images of prosperity, reverence, and confidence, which he constantly sought to 
express. 
Conclusion 
As with Roosevelt, I have conluded that Reagan’s success can be explained through his 
display of my three qualities, with particular focus given to his communication aptitude.  It is 
through these qualities that Reagan was able to restore pride and patriotism, while also making 
significant strides in foreign policy. 
Lyndon Johnson 
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Born in August of 1908, Lyndon Johnson’s life spanned nearly 8 decades, during which the 
nation experienced two world wars, a severe depression, and a handful of other significant 
dilemmas.70  Johnson’s childhood was spent in the heartland of Texas, where he enjoyed a 
modest, and at a times disadvantaged, lifestyle.  Although scholarly accounts differ regarding the 
Johnson family’s financial status, Johnson was afforded upper-echelon notoriety due to his 
lineage.  Speaking of Johnson’s kin, author Thomas Langston claims, “His ancestors and 
relations included a number of accomplished men and women – a college president, numerous 
teachers, preachers, lawyers and other professionals.”71 In fact, Lyndon’s father Sam served in 
the Texas House of Representatives, which seems to be the earliest source of Lyndon’s interest 
in political life.72  Although Johnson was successful in the vast majority of his political ventures, 
as a president Johnson failed.  Despite his domestic policy accomplishments, Johnson’s 
disastrous handling of Vietnam overshadows his achievements.  Johnson’s inability to handle 
Vietnam was largely due to his lack of adaptive leadership.  By examining Johnson’s political 
career prior to entering the presidency, it becomes very apparent that Johnson was able to work 
through political quagmires, rather than relying upon adaptive leadership to resolve issues.  
During his presidency, Johnson attempted to apply his unyielding work ethic, as he had in the 
past, rather than demonstrating adaptive leadership.  I believe that his failure to demonstrate 
adaptive leadership ultimately led to his demise.  In the following section I will provide evidence 
that illustrates how Johnson’s approach to work bore successes during his pre-presidential career, 
yet proved fatal for him as president. 
Adaptive Leadership 
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 While Johnson’s early interest in politics was overshadowed by lackluster academic 
performance and a short stint in California, he formally entered politics in 1931 as a secretary for 
newly elected Richard Kleberg, who represented Texas’s 14th District in the U.S. House of 
Representatives.  As a secretary, Johnson first demonstrated his passion for work, as he single-
handedly managed the entire political office.  By most accounts, Kleberg was not particularly 
interested in politics.  Instead, Kleberg had decided to participate in the special election in large 
part because of his business interests.  Scholar Randall Woods asserts, “Richard Kleberg had 
little or no interest in being a congressman.  He had run to represent his class and his vested 
interests in the national legislature and for the prestige of living large in the nation’s capital.”73  
Although Johnson offered a sharp contrast to Kleberg, the relationship served both individuals 
well, proving to be particularly beneficial for Johnson.  According to Langston,  
Johnson had the good fortune to be an ambitious young man working for an older man who had no 
ambition at all.  Kleberg just wanted to play golf and have drinks, leaving his work to Johnson.  
Because Johnson loved work as much as Kleberg detested it, they made an odd but effective team, 
and Johnson had wide latitude to exercise his influence.74 
 
Through his position as secretary, Johnson quickly made inroads to various Washington 
politicians, while familiarizing himself with the workings of the federal government.  Although 
Johnson tended to virtually all matters related to the 14th district, he found himself unemployed 
in 1935 due to his souring relationship with Kleberg’s wife.  Upon his dismissal from Kleberg’s 
staff, Johnson immediately sought counsel from Texas congressmen Maury Maverick and Sam 
Rayburn.75  Although neither individual was able to offer Johnson a position on their staff, both 
played instrumental roles in Johnson’s quest to head the newly formed National Youth 
Administration.  
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 The National Youth Administration (NYA) was one of the many social welfare programs 
created during Roosevelt’s New Deal.  Originally the brainchild of Eleanor Roosevelt, NYA 
sought to provide employment to the America’s youth between the ages of sixteen and twenty-
five, which exhibited disturbingly high levels of unemployment during the Great Depression.76 
Through his relationships with Rayburn and Maverick, Johnson was appointed director of the 
Texas NYA at the age of 26.  Johnson’s newly acquired position was significant in that it 
allowed him to develop political appeal.  In discussing Johnson’s role as director of NYA, author 
Robert Caro states, “His NYA job allowed Lyndon Johnson to expand not just his organization 
but his acquaintance.”77  Through NYA, Johnson developed relationships that would provide him 
with the support necessary for his future congressional campaigns.  Woods also recognizes the 
significance of NYA in Johnson’s political career.  According to Woods, “Directing the National 
Youth Administration was a perfect fit for Johnson.  It would allow him to get his name in 
newspapers throughout Texas as a community builder and benefactor of the state’s youth.”78  
The NYA was indeed a stepping-stone, as Johnson became a U.S. Representative only two years 
after his appointment to the organization. 
 With the sudden death of James Buchanan, Texas’s 10th District was in need of a new 
representative.  Johnson quickly recognized the opportunity and announced his candidacy in 
what would develop into an eight-way race.  During the race, Johnson distinguished himself by 
pledging support to Roosevelt’s New Deal.  “Running as a hundred-percent New Dealer, 
promising President Franklin Delano Roosevelt support for all his policies, including the 
controversial presidential plan to expand the Supreme Court, Johnson won the election and the 
                                                
76 Caro, Robert.  The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power.  (Alfred A Knopf:  New York, 1982), 
342 
77 Ibid, 361. 
78 Woods, 107. 
  37 
notice of the president.”79  In addition to his support for the New Deal, Johnson relied upon his 
unyielding work ethic to fend off rivals.  According to Woods, “If nothing else, Johnson was 
determined to outwork his opponents.”80 Johnson’s platform proved successful, as he triumphed 
over his competition and secured the seat.  While Johnson’s support for New Deal legislation 
proved to increase his political viability, it also laid the framework for Johnson’s relationship 
with, and adoration of, with President Roosevelt. 
 After becoming a representative, Johnson’s continued to exhibit a strenuous work schedule.  
Unger claims that in working so many hours, “LBJ almost literally worked his fingers to the 
bone, developing a rash on his hand that cracked the skin and caused bleeding.”81 Johnson’s hard 
work served him well in the early stages of his political career, as he quickly rose to a position of 
prominence within the House.  He served in the House of Representatives for roughly ten years 
before winning a seat in the Senate.  Like his congressional race a decade earlier, Johnson had 
been in a frenzied state as he campaigned vigorously.  Although he had become ill during the 
latter part of his campaign, Johnson refused medical treatment.  Johnson’s reaction to his illness 
was typical, as he focused all his energies on outworking his opponent Coke Robert Stevenson 
and paid little attention to his personal wellbeing.  According to Unger, Johnson’s condition had 
appeared before his campaign and worsened throughout the race.  
Even before he announced for the Senate, Johnson had been feeling ill and complaining about 
abdominal pains and nausea that had usually accompanied kidney stones in the past.  By the time 
he made his opening campaign speech, he needed painkillers to get through the evening.  
Undaunted, he continued to drive around the Texas panhandle making campaign speeches, 
dripping with perspiration form his fevers and doubled up with pain between his appearances 
before the public.82  
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Despite his deteriorating health, Johnson whole-heartedly refused medical treatment until it 
became absolutely necessary.  It was not until the pain became unbearable that Johnson agreed to 
receive medical treatment, and only on the condition that he receive expedited treatment from the 
Mayo Clinic.83  The episode offered another example of Johnson’s steadfast ambition and work 
ethic, as he believed he was capable of working through his illness.  While in the Senate, 
Johnson’s extreme work behaviors persisted.   
Johnson managed the Senate by ruthlessly driving himself and his staff.  He put his office on a 
twenty-four-hour day, with shifts running day and night.  He himself worked from sunup until the 
early hours of the next day, routinely talking and chain-smoking through eighteen or twenty hour 
days, barely pausing to inhale his meals.84  
 
By working long days and exerting unmatched effort, Johnson quickly rose among the Senate’s 
ranks, and won him national recognition as a politician committed to public service.       
 Johnson served in the Senate for twelve years before receiving John Kennedy’s invitation to 
run alongside him on the Democratic ticket in 1960.  As Woods recalls, “The Kennedys had not 
really wanted him, but the Democrats had to have Texas to win the presidency, and LBJ, the 
Lone Star State’s most famous contemporary politician, could carry Texas.”85  Johnson accepted 
the offer and served as vice president for three years until Kennedy’s assassination.  Although he 
had been a distant, if not absent, member of the Kennedy administration with relatively little 
responsibility, after the assassination Johnson found himself at the forefront of the federal 
government. 
 In assuming Kennedy’s role, Johnson became heir to a host of issues which had gradually 
developed during the Kennedy Administration.  Domestically, Johnson was forced to deal with 
the growing demand for civil rights and the economy’s less than stellar performance over the 
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past three years.  With over 30 years of experience in politics, these issues were not particularly 
concerning to Johnson.  Yet international policy was entirely different from domestic policy, and 
at times Johnson found himself unable to deal with such issues.  Commenting on his 
performance on a diplomat, scholar Bruce Schulman comments,  
Outside the nation’s borders the political master seemingly lost his touch.  He had to rely on the 
advice of experts, to navigate by abstract principles rather than by the sure instincts about that 
really worked and guided him so well in Congress.  Often he misapplied tried-and-true techniques 
of domestic political combat to international problems, where they were hopelessly out of place.86  
 
Of the numerous foreign policy issues Johnson inherited, Vietnam proved to be the most 
significant obstacle to the Johnson Administration. 
 While in power, John Kennedy supported an independent South Vietnam.  Believing that the 
Asian nation was an integral part in preventing the “Domino Theory,” President Kennedy sought 
to prevent South Vietnam from falling to communism.  Although he was reluctant to send troops, 
Kennedy provided support to South Vietnam in a variety of forms.  According to Schulman, 
Kennedy opted “instead to send equipment, economic assistance, and several thousand military 
advisers.”87  By the time Johnson became president, the United States was well committed to the 
defense of South Vietnam.  
 In the early stages of his presidency Johnson preferred to avoid military conflict with 
Vietnam and was primarily focused on increasing his political viability in the 1964 election.  
Intrinsic in his concern was the idea that political opponents would brand him as a communist 
sympathizer if he failed to protect South Vietnam.  According to John Bullion, Johnson’s 
concerns were not unfounded.  “Lyndon was back on the highwire.  Polls confirmed his feeling 
that being seen as soft on Communism would hurt his popularity.  So Vietnam was one of the 
few issues Barry Goldwater could use to narrow the gap between him and LBJ.  Seeming weak 
                                                
86 Schulman, 134. 
87 Ibid, 139. 
  40 
in Southeast Asia also worked to the advantage of Robert Kennedy.”88  In addition to the 
electoral implication, Johnson’s Vietnam strategy was also influenced by former president 
Dwight Eisenhower.  Washington Post White House Correspondent Edward Folliard claims that 
“Ike had told him [Johnson] that it would be a tragic mistake for the United States to back down 
and allow the Communists to achieve a victory in Southeast Asia.”89   
In a delicate balance of force, Johnson authorized bombings throughout the summer of 
1964 yet refused to retaliate against North Vietnamese aggressions in November.  Johnson’s 
inconsistent Vietnam strategy was most likely the result of his conflicting interests.  While he 
wanted to maintain an anti-communist image, Johnson also worried about the possibility of 
creating unwanted conflicts.  Bullion states that Johnson’s reluctance to use massive-strike 
capabilities was based other presidents’ experiences.  
 “He [Johnson] remembered how in November 1950 the Truman administration had paid no 
attention to Chinese warnings about American military operations close to the Yalu River.  The 
price paid for that had been massive attacks by the Chinese army and a stalemated war.  Johnson 
was determined to avoid giving China any provocations whatsoever in this war.”90 
 
With the worry of provocation fresh in his mind, Johnson chose to ignore the advice of his 
military advisors who argued for a surge.  Johnson’s also went against those in his administration 
who called for a complete withdrawal from South Vietnam.  Perhaps the largest peace advocate 
in Johnson’s administration, vice-president Hubert Humphrey pleaded with Johnson to abandon 
Vietnam.  “In January 1965, Hubert Humphrey told LBJ that his landslide left him in the rarest 
of positions, where one can do as one pleases.  That being so, Hubert urged negotiations leading 
toward American withdrawal.”91  After silencing and publicly ridiculing Humphrey, Johnson 
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pressed forward with an indecisive strategy, which eventually led to a massive buildup of U.S. 
troops in Vietnam.    
Looking back on Vietnam, some scholars referring to the conflict as Johnson’s “obsession.”  
After thirty years of political success, Vietnam proved to be the unraveling of Lyndon Johnson, 
who after his 1964 term declined to pursue the Democratic nomination in 1968.  Although 
Johnson’s health had been on the decline for several years, his exit from politics was most likely 
the result of his poor performance with Vietnam, which can be explained through his lack of 
adaptive leadership.  While a more adaptive leader would have taken a multifaceted approach to 
Vietnam, in which a host of military and diplomatic strategies were employed, Johnson 
abandoned diplomacy for military superiority.  Although Johnson claimed to desire a negotiated 
settlement to the Vietnam conflict, by increasing the nation’s military involvement he inevitably 
decreased the likelihood of arranging for a peaceful settlement.   
During his political career prior to the presidency, Johnson triumphed by utilizing his 
superior work ethic; when dealing with domestic issues, Johnson was able to “outwork” his 
competition in order to achieve desirable results.  Nevertheless, although such tactics proved 
futile at the international level, Johnson relentlessly persisted.  Lacking the adaptive leadership 
necessary to alter his situation, Johnson continued to pour effort into the Vietnam conflict, 
hoping that his labors would result in American victory.  Eventually, Johnson’s inability to 
practice adaptive leadership led to his demise.   
Citizen Compassion 
 Johnson’s citizen compassion was manifest throughout his career in public service.  From his 
earliest days with NYA, Johnson worked to improve the lives of his fellow Texans, and his 
desire to help others increased upon his entrance into public office.  According to author Robert 
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Dallek, as a U.S. Representative Johnson made every effort to assist his constituency.  In 
discussing the state of the economy in Johnson’s district, Dallek states:  
Money was in such short supply in the early thirties that the area functioned as a barter economy . 
. . But Johnson found ways to help.  In 1938 – 41, when hundreds of farmers couldn’t qualify for 
Farm Security Administration loans because they had no collateral, Johnson persuaded the FS to 
waive the requirement and give each of 400 families a $50 loan.92 
 
As a representative, Johnson also demonstrated citizen compassion through his support for the 
Marshal Ford Dam, which helped to control flooding and provide electricity to the greater Austin 
area.93  In regards to the dam Unger claims that, “The dam affair solidified Johnson’s reputation 
in the business community.”94 
 Johnson’s attentiveness to the public’s desires continued during his stint in the Senate.  Civil 
rights had developed into a major domestic issue during the 1950s, and Johnson emerged as the 
movement’s political leader.  Although in his earlier days Johnson had never taken a firm 
position on either side of the civil rights dilemma, during the 1950s Johnson began to gravitate 
towards a pro-civil rights platform.  As Schulman recognizes,  
When the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Brown v. Board of Education, three-fourths 
of the people in Texas opposed the Court, and President Eisenhower refused to endorse the 
decision.  Johnson, however, publicly defended the Court.  Two years late, southern members of 
Congress issued a southern manifesto promising to resist the Brown decision.  Johnson was one of 
only three southern senators who refused to sign it.95 
 
After acknowledging that the American public favored equal rights, Johnson set forward to help 
direct the passage of a civil rights legislation.  Johnson went to great extremes to ensure the 
passage of the bill, formally known as the Civil Rights Act of 1957.  As Unger recalls, “The civil 
rights triumph was Johnson’s, requiring all the political talent he possessed in pulling together 
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radically divergent groups, keeping his party from an open and possibly permanent split, and 
convincing enough Republicans to vote against the administration.”96   
 As Vice President and President, Johnson continued to demonstrate citizen compassion 
through his unyielding support for civil rights.  Despite the Kennedy Administration’s offering 
subdued endorsement of civil rights legislation, Johnson lobbied hard for the advancement of 
minority rights.  According to Schulman, “In the spring of 1963, as the Kennedy administration 
prepared to submit civil rights legislation to Congress, Vice President Johnson broke his usual 
silence in high-level meetings and pressed JFK to introduce a tough, no-holds-barred bill that 
would end segregation in the South once and for all.”97  Not surprisingly, upon entering the 
presidency, Johnson pressed forward with the intention of helping less fortunate citizens.  
Through his domestic agenda, which he titled the Great Society, Johnson believed he could 
improve the state of the nation by establishing work groups aimed at optimizing government 
performance.  Scholar Hugh Davis Graham asserts, “From this commitment spring the Johnson 
task forces – ultimately 135 of them by present count . . . the task force device was designed to 
interrupt the normal bureaucratic flow, provide innovation, combat the inherent inertia and 
boundary maintenance of the agencies, and maximize the leverage of the presidential 
battalion.”98  Ultimately the program would help those who had failed to experience the 
economic prosperity of the 1950s.  “Although LBJ included something for everyone in his 
reform package, he concentrated on the unfortunate, on those who had been forgotten and passed 
over and passed by.”99  Citizen compassion was an important element of politics for Johnson, 
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and throughout his political career he frequently demonstrated his commitment to the common 
man.   
Communication Style 
Lyndon Johnson possessed impressive communication skills and regularly used his aptitudes 
to develop relationships with key stakeholders and propel his policy agenda.  Shortly after 
assuming the presidency Johnson sought to unify the saddened nation.  According to author 
Frank Cormier, “Johnson in fact wanted to make cheerleaders and devoted followers out of all 
Americans.  In a dizzy whirl of meetings after Kennedy’s murder, day after day and often long 
into the night Johnson gave voice to emotional appeals for unity and support from a people 
traumatized by the assassination.”100  By communicating with the public, Johnson helped console 
the Nation and bring about closure to the Kennedy tragedy.    
Although Johnson openly communicated with the American public in the early stages of his 
presidency, Johnson and the public grew more distant over the course of his presidency.  Though 
his communication with the public was not extraordinary, Johnson demonstrated impressive 
communication skills with the news media.  While in office, Johnson also made appeals to White 
House media personnel, which he believed was necessary in order to bridge the gap between the 
American public and the federal government.  Johnson developed a close relationship with the 
news media by furthering his predecessor’s “open door” policy.  In the early years of his 
administration, Johnson hosted numerous events geared toward extending camaraderie to 
members of the press corp.  As Cormier recalls, “Besides hunting expeditions, lake cruises and 
fish frys, members of the press corps, and our bosses, were treated to cocktails and sherry in the 
family living room upstairs at the White House, luncheons in the family dining room, safaris 
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around the back yard, and dips in the White House swimming pool.”101  These events, along with 
Johnson’s appeals to the general public, offer a primary example of his communication abilities. 
Yet while these situations utilized Johnson’s charm and compassion to appeal to the public and 
the media, the former president was best known for mastering the art of persuasion. 
Johnson’s overwhelming confidence allowed him to dominate conversations.  Dating as far 
back as his days at Southwest Texas State Teacher’s College in San Marcos, Johnson would 
regularly control arguments with his peers.  Dallek captures Johnson’s aggressive method in his 
book by providing an excerpt from an interview with one of Johnson’s classmates at San Marcos.  
As the classmate recalls, “He’d [Johnson] just interrupt you – my God, his voice would just ride 
over you until you stopped.  He monopolized the conversation from the time he came in to the 
time he left.”102  Johnson’s argumentative style, which would latter be referred to as “The 
Johnson treatment,” became a mainstay in Johnson’s political career.   
The Johnson treatment was critical to Lyndon Johnson’s success as a politician, aiding him 
most in the Senate.  By administering the Johnson treatment, Johnson would persuade his 
counterparts to vote for a particular policy and pledge their support to him.  According to 
Schulman, the Johnson Treatment was a multifaceted style of communication he would utilize to 
persuade his peers.  “He could please, tease, cajole, trade, deal, threaten – grab a man by his 
lapels, speak right into his face, look into his heart, and convince him that he had always wanted 
to vote the way LBJ was asking.”103  Johnson’s Vice President, Hubert Humphrey, was a 
frequent victim of the Johnson treatment during his twenty-year professional relationship with 
Johnson in the Senate and the White House.  In a conversation with Hubert Humphrey, 
columnist Robert Allen recalls, 
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Humphrey told me how Johnson gave him pep talks and Humphrey demonstrated saying, ‘He’d 
grab me by the lapels and say, “Now, Hubert, I want you to do this and that and get going,’” and 
with that he would kick him in the shins hard.  Then Humphrey added, “Look,” and he pulled up 
his trouser leg and, sure enough, he had some scars there.104 
 
Through his barrage of verbal and physical procedures, Johnson gained impressive power in the 
Senate and was able to advance many of his legislative policies.  Although he was somewhat 
removed from the legislative process while in the White House, the former senator still 
frequently employed his notorious persuasive strategy in order to drive his policy agenda.  
Following in Kennedy’s footsteps, Thomas Langston states “President Johnson urged Congress 
to pass a new civil rights bill and an economic stimulus bill as testaments to the slain leader’s 
memory.  Behind the scenes, Johnson assiduously bargained and pleaded with his former 
colleagues in Congress.”105  One of Johnson’s most memorable displays of the treatment came in 
June of 1965, when Johnson met with the American Medical Association to discuss Medicare 
and Medicaid.   
On June 29, the AMA leadership assembled in the West Wing and were promptly given a large 
dose of the Johnson treatment.  LBJ began by saying what wonderful people doctors were, 
recalling how the local physician in Johnson City had made numerous house calls to treat his 
ailing father.  He stood and stretched; they stood.  He sat.  They sat.  LBJ then delivered a moving 
statement about “this great nation and its obligation to those who had helped make it great and 
who were now old and sick and helpless through no fault of their own.”  He stood again.  They 
stood.  He sat, and they followed suit, now perfectly clear as to who was in control.106   
 
Similar to how he had acted in the Senate, Lyndon Johnson utilized his communication 
techniques to impose his will upon others and coerce them into acting in according with his 
desires.  Throughout his time in office, such skills allowed him to garner support from his 
constituents and his peers and enabled him to achieve legislative victories.   
Conclusion 
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 Despite his superior communication skills and his numerous displays of citizen compassion, 
Lyndon Johnson left the presidency mired in controversy.  Although he possessed two of the 
characteristics necessary for success, his failure to demonstrate adaptive leadership proved fatal.  
By lacking adaptive leadership, Johnson found himself unable to navigate the nation out of the 
Vietnam conflict, despite exerting immeasurable effort to remedy the situation.  Ultimately, the 
absence of adaptive leadership in Lyndon Johnson’s character led to his downfall. 
Richard Nixon 
Richard Milhous Nixon was born in 1913, in the small town of Whittier, California.  As the 
son of Quaker parents living in a predominantly Quaker community, Nixon experienced a 
desolate childhood that stemmed from his father’s stern demeanor and the death of two 
brothers.107  Yet despite his woes, Nixon displayed a prowess for academics from a very young 
age and evolved into an impressive student while in high school.  According to biographer 
Conrad Black, “He was a very strong student, who worked while his classmates relaxed.  He 
studied with fierce determination, forcing himself to succeed whether he possessed any liking or 
aptitude for the subjects or not.”108  Nixon’s astuteness won him a scholarship to an Ivy League 
college, yet due to financial constraints he opted to instead attend nearby Whittier College.109  
Nixon again prevailed in school and eventually went on to attend Duke Law School.  Yet despite 
receiving his law degree from a prestigious university, he eventually returned home to Whittier, 
where he entered private practice.  Less than ten years after graduating from Duke, Nixon began 
his political career as California’s newly elected representative for the 12th District.110   
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Like Lyndon Johnson, Nixon enjoyed a quick ascent to power yet failed in his final test of 
political ability.  I consider Nixon’s presidency to be unsuccessful because many of Nixon’s 
problems were self-imposed.  Nixon lacked citizen compassion and, despite his attempts to 
appear as a sympathetic individual, never developed true sincerity.  To make matters worse, 
Nixon’s presidency was plagued by inferior communication skills, which were manifest in his 
poor relationship with the media.  Yet, while Nixon lacked citizen compassion and 
communication skills, he was an adaptive leader throughout his political career.  Research into 
Nixon’s past reveals that his political triumphs were largely built on his ability to demonstrate 
adaptive leadership.  Ultimately however, Nixon’s adaptive leadership was not enough to secure 
a successful presidency.    
Adaptive Leadership  
Throughout his adult life, Richard Nixon was the epitome of an adaptive leader.  Nixon’s 
political career was built with his adaptive leadership, as he regularly modified his policy 
platform to address the most salient issues of the era.  Through his adaptive leadership, Nixon 
excelled in a political arena which had traditionally been dominated by social elites.  Although 
he was plagued by a general lack of confidence and a plethora of insecurities, Nixon’s adaptive 
leadership helped guide him to political glory. 
Nixon’s adaptive leadership became apparent for perhaps the first time while he was attending 
Whittier College.  While Whittier College lacked fraternities and sororities, there were several 
“literary societies” on campus which closely resembled Greek life.  During his first semester at 
Whittier, Nixon failed to receive an invitation to join the Franklins, the only male literary 
society.  Although Nixon was disappointed about not receiving an offer from the Franklins, it 
provided him with the opportunity to found his own literary society.  According to Black, “When 
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he was not approached by the Franklins, he quickly accepted an invitation to be a charter 
member of a new group, called the Orthogonians.”111  Through his affiliation with the 
Ortogonians, Nixon developed relationships with a host of individuals that served as his primary 
base of support during numerous student campaigns.  As he had exhibited through the creation of 
the Orthogonians, Nixon again demonstrated adaptive leadership by adopting a host of 
progressive positions during his quest for the student-body presidency. Author Fawn Brodie 
captures Nixon’s transformation by stating, 
The student [Nixon] who disliked dancing presented as a major plank in his campaign for student-
body president the right of students to dance on campus.  The boy who would not wear a shirt to 
school unless it was freshly starched now helped to organize a new fraternity where the badge of 
membership was an open shirt without a tie.  The fastidious child who could not stand the smell of 
the unwashed students on the high school bus had become a scrimmager on the football field, and 
had won fame by being the first in the college’s history to add to the annual bonfire an outdoor 
privy with four rather than two holes.112 
 
By recognizing that he needed to change in order to become a viable candidate, Nixon ventured 
out of his typical realm of conservatism and aloofness to gain the votes of his peers. 
 Nixon’s ability to recognize salient issues continued during his run for Congress.  When 
Nixon entered politics in the mid 1940s, fears of communism were widespread throughout the 
nation.  As Brodie recalls, “In California, as elsewhere, the American middle class as well as the 
far right for years had feared Communism . . . Anxiety over Soviet expansion in Europe affected 
both parties, but the Republicans in 1946 did their best to capitalize on it as a specifically 
Republican issue.”113  While prior to entering politics Nixon never demonstrated a profound 
repugnance for Communism, during his 1946 campaign Nixon adopted an anti-Communist 
platform to appeal to his electorate.  Along with frequently declaring his loathing for 
Communism, Nixon also went so far as to characterize his opponent Jerry Voorhis as a 
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Communist sympathizer. Wicker asserts that, “In victory, however, he had relentlessly pursued a 
tactic that was relatively new in 1946: implying that an opponent was “soft on” or dangerously 
ignorant about Communism, or even lacking in patriotism.”114  Although Nixon’s strategy may 
be interpreted as devious, it won him the election and afforded him a devout following.  Through 
his recognition of the public’s fear of Communism and his adoption of an anti-Communism 
platform, Nixon displayed adaptive leadership.       
Once in Congress, Nixon earned political clout by exploiting the public’s fear of Communism.  
Through his position on the House Un-American Activities Committee, Nixon shed light upon 
various individuals accused of supporting the Communist party.  Among Nixon’s major 
accomplishments while in Congress was the spurring of the Alger Hiss prosecution and 
conviction.  Hiss was a communist informant who had held various positions in the State 
Department and the federal government.  After the Hiss conviction Nixon became a very well 
known political figure and opted to run for the U.S. Senate in 1950.   
With Communism still a pressing issue Nixon repeated his Congressional campaign strategy 
by once again publicizing his opponent’s failure to confront Communism.  In discussing his 
opponent Heather Douglas, Nixon associated her with Communist sympathizer Vito 
Marcantonio.  On a flyer distributed throughout California by Nixon’s campaign staff, Nixon 
claimed, “During five years in Congress, Helen Douglas has voted 353 times exactly as has Vito 
Marcantonio, the notorious Communist party-line Congressman from New York . . . . How can 
Helen Douglas, capable actress that she is, take up so strange a role as a foe of communism?”115  
The strategy proved successful, as Nixon coasted into the Senate.  Through his adaptive 
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leadership, Nixon again recognized the most significant issues of the campaign and adopted a 
platform favorable to his electorate.     
While Nixon pioneered himself as a leader against communist intrusion in the United States, 
the latter years of his political career were quite different.  As a member of the Eisenhower 
administration Nixon evolved into an international diplomat, traveling to the Soviet Union in 
1959.116  Upon becoming president in 1969, Nixon almost immediately set out to improve the 
United States’ hostile relationship with the Soviet Union.  Although he had been exceedingly 
vocal about his distaste for communism during the 1940s and 1950s, he opted to pursue 
diplomacy with the U.S.S.R.  While Nixon’s policy reversal offers an example of adaptive 
leadership, as he recognized the trend away from stigmatization of the Soviets and acted 
accordingly, his means for dealing with the U.S.S.R. offers a more profound example of adaptive 
leadership. 
According to author James Humes, Nixon was at first skeptical about meeting with the 
Soviets due to his predecessors’ relative failures.  “Nixon viewed recent summit meetings, such 
as that between Kennedy and Khrushchev in Geneva in 1962 and Lyndon Johnson and Brezhnev 
in Glassboro, New Jersey, in 1967, as disasters.”117  In large part, Nixon believed that Kennedy 
and Johnson had failed because they lacked the bargaining chips necessary to secure substantive 
arms agreements.  For Nixon, “Such constructive diplomatic bargaining would occur only if the 
United States went to the conference table with some heavy cards.  Nixon the strategist wanted 
to have two cards to strengthen his hand: the first, an ABM (antiballistic missile), the defensive 
weapon to repel missile strikes; and second, rapprochement with mainland China.”118  While 
both proved to be useful in securing the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, Nixon’s move to develop a 
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relationship with China offers an impressive display of adaptive leadership, as the President 
drifted from his profound anti-communist platform to achieve in areas where his predecessors 
had failed.  In discussing Nixon’s calculated move to increase communication between the U.S. 
and China, scholar Robert Dallek asserts,  
They [Nixon and Kissinger] worried that improved relations with China might impede Soviet-
American cooperation.  On balance, though, they thought it would spur Moscow to be more 
conciliatory.  It could give them greater “leverage against the Soviet Union.”  For Nixon, it was a 
triumph of realistic foreign policy thinking over his earlier knee-jerk anticommunism, which had 
been so useful in advancing his political career.119      
 
Although Nixon repeatedly expressed his disdain for communism throughout the early stages of 
his political career, by exhibiting adaptive leadership he was able to overcome the hostile 
relationships with foreign lands and assemble international agreements.    
Citizen Compassion 
Attempting to quantify or even understand Richard Nixon’s sense of citizen compassion is a 
formidable task.  At first glance it may seem that Nixon altogether lacked citizen compassion, 
yet such a view would ignore Nixon’s early political successes, which were deeply rooted in his 
expression of citizen compassion.  In his book, In the Arena, Richard Nixon offers a valiant 
explanation as to why he entered politics.  In the concluding paragraph of the chapter Purpose, 
Nixon claims, “As I look back to the time I made the decision to enter politics forty-three years 
ago, three goals motivated me: peace abroad, a better life for people at home, and the victory of 
freedom over tyranny throughout the world.”120  Nixon’s second reason, “a better life for people 
at home,” suggests that expressing citizen compassion may have been one of Nixon’s chief 
concerns.  However, while throughout his early political career Nixon demonstrated a keen sense 
of awareness in regards to the public’s opinions, more often than not Nixon appeared to lack 
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sincerity, or even character.  Because he lacked any sort of emotional intelligence, a concept 
pioneered by Fred Greenstein, it is hard to imagine Nixon as perceptive of the public’s needs.  
Reviewing Nixon’s political career offers only trace examples of citizen compassion. 
 During his campaign for Congress in the mid 1940s, Nixon demonstrated citizen compassion 
by acknowledging the significance of communism to American voters.  Although his reliance on 
slander proved to be a key part of his run for office, by campaigning as a hard-line 
anticommunist Nixon appealed to the majority of California voters who fretted over possible 
communist infiltration.  As Dallek states, “Although intelligence and high energy were essential 
elements in Nixon’s rise to political power, they were not enough to explain his extraordinary 
success.  A visceral feel for what voters wanted to hear – expressions of shared values – also 
brilliantly served his political ambition.”121  Yet despite Nixon’s ability to sympathize with 
voters, at some point in his political career Nixon grew increasingly distant from the electorate.  
This distance was perhaps most evident during the 1960 presidential election, when Nixon failed 
to convince the electorate that he was humble candidate.  
Unlike the campaigns against Voorhis, Douglas, and Stevenson, in which Nixon could present 
himself as an aspiring middle American battling elitists, he could not draw a similar contrast to 
Kennedy.  True, Nixon had known poverty as a youngster, and Kennedy, the son of one of 
America’s richest men, was more privileged than any other opponent Nixon had ever faced.  But 
as a senator, Kennedy stood lower in the political pecking order than Vice President Nixon, and as 
a Catholic representing an underrepresented minority, Kennedy was more the man on the make 
than Nixon.122 
 
Nixon’s inability to relate to voters in the 1960 election proved to be a recurring theme 
throughout the remainder of his political career.  While 1960 offers a stark contrast with the 
Nixon of the 1940s who championed the electorate’s concerns, many scholars believe that the 
presidential election against John Kennedy offers an accurate image of Richard Nixon.  As many 
have noted, Nixon was notorious for his cold personality.  According to Iwan Morgan, “Nixon 
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himself sometimes recognized that he came across as lacking sincerity, such as when he was 
bested by Kennedy in the first presidential debate in 1960.”123  This recognition paved the way 
for Nixon’s campaign strategy in 1968, where he relied heavily upon television to reconstruct his 
public image.   
 Believing that his aloofness was to blame for his defeat in 1960, Nixon approached 1968 
with the intention of developing a more amiable image.  In his detailed account of Nixon’s 
campaign strategy, author Joe McGinnis asserts that Nixon’s staff utilized television to recreate 
Nixon.  According to McGinniss, Nixon’s staff attempted to present Nixon as a warm and 
compassionate individual.124  And while Nixon’s scheme to convince voters worked in 1968, the 
coldness forever remained a part of his personality.  Even in the height of the infamous 
Watergate scandal, Nixon failed to stray from his aloof demeanor.  According to Wicker, “Even 
in the bleakest hours, though he obviously tried, Nixon could not be a man of warmth and easy 
affection.”125  Without sincerity, Nixon routinely failed to demonstrate citizen compassion 
throughout his presidency.   
Whereas some presidents have failed to demonstrate citizen compassion because of their 
apathy for the American public, Richard Nixon’s failure to exhibit citizen compassion was 
caused by his inability to do so.  It wasn’t that Nixon did not care about the public’s concerns, 
but rather that he lacked the interpersonal skills necessary to discern the public’s interests.  
Undoubtedly, Nixon’s lack of citizen compassion was detrimental to his presidency in that a 
distance always existed between America and the President.  Nevertheless, many voters were 
aware of Nixon’s detachment prior to 1968 and still chose him as their leader.  Because voters 
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accepted Nixon as a cold individual, his lack of citizen compassion did not play a major role in 
the collapse of his presidency.   
Communication Skills 
Lacking strong interpersonal skills, Nixon was by no means a gifted communicator.  As a 
socially awkward individual, Nixon found himself to be an outsider in a role traditionally filled 
by extroverts like Kennedy or Johnson.  While there are trace instances of Nixon’s 
communication strength throughout his political career, such as the famous Checkers speech in 
which Nixon dispelled rumors about relying upon a secret fund, Nixon’s career is generally void 
of noteworthy displays of communication aptitude.  However, in analyzing Nixon’s 
communication techniques it becomes very obvious that the former president harbored an intense 
animosity towards the news media.  This section focuses on Nixon’s notorious relationship with 
the media and the effects of that relationship on Nixon’s administration. 
Nixon’s abhorrence of the press was a constant theme throughout the majority of his years in 
public office.  As Thomas Johnson recalls, “Despite occasional protests to the contrary, Nixon 
always bore an almost pathological hatred for the press . . . The conservative Nixon believed he 
was the lighting rod of criticism for the liberal media and he was the victim of a double 
standard.”126  Nixon’s distaste for the press helped foster an unpleasant relationship between the 
Executive Office and the media.  
 Although hostility for the media existed during Nixon’s presidency, in the early stages of his 
political career Nixon developed close ties with the press.  In his 1946 congressional campaign 
against Jerry Voorhis, Nixon received backing from the Los Angels Times.  Black states that,  
In May 1946, Nixon made a deferential visit to the journalistic powerhouse of Southern 
California, the Los Angeles Times.  He was received by the principal political writer, Kyle 
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Palmer, who liked Nixon and explicitly supported him . . . Times support was steadily amplified, 
as Palmer increasingly thought that Nixon might actually rid them of Voorhis.127 
 
While Nixon was well received by some members of the media, such as the Times’ reporters, 
other newspapers were very skeptical of Nixon and perhaps even outspoken about his actions as 
a congressman.  During the prosecution of Alger Hiss, the Washington Post was particularly 
critical of HUAC and Nixon.  Although the public’s approval of HUAC hovered around 70%, 
the Post published editorials questioning Nixon’s investigation and HUAC procedures.128  While 
the Post’s reactions to the Hiss trial may have spurred the dislike between Nixon and the media, 
matters worsened when the newspaper broke a story about Nixon possessing a secret fund 
backed by wealthy political supporters.  According to author Russ Witcher, despite Nixon’s bid 
for the vice presidency, “It almost crashed, however, in 1952, when Nixon became the focus of 
stories that accused him of having access to a campaign slush fund.”129  After Nixon denied the 
allegations and refused to withdraw from the Republican ticket, the Post published a scathing 
editorial in which it blasted him for imposing a burden upon the Eisenhower campaign.  
Published on September 25, 1952, the editorial claimed that, “Many people will continue to view 
the Nixon episode as evidence that the Eisenhower crusade is overtolerant of missteps within its 
own membership.  For that reason the Senator Nixon has added a burden to the Eisenhower 
candidacy by his decision not to withdraw.”130  While Nixon managed to recover from the 
incident, he developed a loathing for the press.  
In 1960, Nixon’s frustration with the media became apparent when he attributed his failed 
bid for the presidency to the influence of media on the American electorate.  Scholar Michael 
Genovese claims, “In his first campaign for president, Nixon blamed his loss – in part – on the 
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media.  The debates became, in Nixon’s view, more a beauty contest than a genuine exchange of 
ideas, and Nixon felt victimized by the media.”131 After 1960, Nixon’s dislike for the press was 
well established, and following his defeat in the California gubernatorial election of 1962 Nixon 
boldly voiced his disgust. In an unscheduled press conference shortly after acknowledging his 
loss, Nixon lashed out at the press for what he believed was years of unfair treatment.  “For 16 
years, ever since the Hiss case, you’ve had a lot of fun.  You’ve had an opportunity to attack me 
and I think I’ve given as good as I’ve taken . . . as I leave you, I want you to know just think of 
how much you’re going to be missing; you don’t have Nixon to kick around anymore.”132  While 
during the press conference Nixon vowed to never return to politics, six years later he was 
elected president.  Unfortunately for Nixon, the groundwork for a miserable relationship with the 
Press Corps had already been laid, and the Nixon administration encountered an increasingly 
hostile group of reporters throughout its time in power.   
Though the relationship was sour from the beginning, as President Nixon further damaged 
the situation by moving to squelch the media’s influence on the electorate.  Through the Federal 
Communications Commission, associates of Nixon worked to suspend broadcasting licenses for 
CBS radio and television news channels in Miami, Florida and Jacksonville, Florida.  
Meanwhile, Vice President Spiro Agnew gave several speeches which called into question the 
integrity of the news media.133  Although Nixon went through his presidency without the media’s 
support, or confidence for that matter, the poor relationship proved to be detrimental primarily 
with the surfacing of the Watergate scandal.     
 Before discussing the Watergate scandal as it relates to Nixon’s relationship with the press, it 
is necessary to provide a working definition of Watergate for the purpose of my research.  
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Although in some scholarship Watergate refers to the break-in at the Watergate office complex, 
for this essay Watergate refers to the myriad of scandalous affairs that occurred during the Nixon 
Administration involving the Plumbers, reelection efforts, and the cover-up conspiracy.  While 
Nixon was able to avoid disaster during his first term, the investigative efforts of Bob Woodward 
and Carl Bernstein, both reporters for the Washington Post, slowly uncovered the 
Administration’s attempts to cover-up wrongdoings.  The highly investigative nature of reporting 
was unique at the time, and Genovese indeed recognizes the dramatic change in journalism 
exhibited during Watergate, calling it “more intrusive, more critical, less trusting and always 
looking for the “gotcha” blockbuster exposé.”134  Undoubtedly, Richard Nixon was at the root of 
the Watergate scandal and the reporters were correct to have exposed the president’s wrong 
doings.  Yet it seems that Nixon met his demise not because of misconduct, but instead because 
he failed to benefit from a decent relationship with the media.  
 Prior to Nixon, presidents had been involved in cover-ups, conspiracies, and other suspect 
activities.  Perhaps most notable was President Kennedy, who misled the public during his Bay 
of Pigs fiasco and regularly trusted the media to keep his secret of infidelity.  Yet unlike his 
predecessors, Nixon was the victim of a new and intrusive form of journalism because he had 
gone to such great lengths to limit the effects of the media on his presidency.  Black seems to be 
in accord with my view by asserting, 
If he [Nixon] had made a little more effort with the media, and not made it clear at all times that he 
considered it a relentlessly adversarial relationship, he would never have had the press eating from 
his hand, as Roosevelt and Kennedy did, and would not have been able to exact the same 
reverential respect as Eisenhower did, or the camaraderie that Truman, a poker-playing, whiskey 
swilling, straightforward extrovert, enjoyed, but he could have done much better than Johnson and 
avoided a good deal of tension.135 
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Although Nixon was at odds with the media throughout most of his political career, his inability 
to work with the media while serving as President ultimately proved fatal, as Nixon opted to 
resign in the midst of a certain impeachment.  Although Nixon rarely exhibited citizen 
compassion, it was his lack of communication skills that led to his downfall.  Nixon’s toxic 
relationship with the press, which in earlier years had been only a thorn in his side, inevitably 
proved to be his undoing.    
Conclusion 
Despite practicing adaptive leadership throughout his professional career, Nixon failed as a 
president.  Although he acknowledged his weaknesses as a politician and President, Nixon 
refused to correct his problems.  While he made an effort to appear more compassionate to the 
electorate, Nixon’s sincerity was a façade, and he was unable to part from his cold demeanor.  
His lack of citizen compassion was coupled with an inability to communicate with the media, 
which secured his downfall.    
Final Conclusion 
Although nearly forty years elapsed between Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency and Ronald 
Reagan’s presidency, both individuals were successful presidents.  I believe much of their 
success can be attributed to their demonstration of my three characteristics.  Similarly, I have 
concluded that both Johnson’s and Nixon’s failed presidencies can be explained by the absence 
of these characteristics.  I would like to conclude my argument by comparing these individuals to 
one another and acknowledging situational factors which may have contributed to the presidents’ 
successes and failures.  
In regards to adaptive leadership, both Roosevelt and Reagan excelled.  Roosevelt relied 
upon adaptive leadership to navigate past roadblocks created by the Court and foreign powers, 
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while Reagan demonstrated adaptive leadership in his handling of defense initiatives and foreign 
policy.  Though both men used adaptive leadership to their advantage, I believe Reagan was a 
more adaptive leader than Roosevelt.  Reagan’s foreign policy transition was by far his largest 
display of adaptive leadership, and improved relations with the U.S.S.R. served as one of the 
hallmarks of the Reagan administration.  Although Roosevelt managed to develop a popular 
foreign policy through the use of adaptive leadership, Reagan’s gains exceed those of Roosevelt.   
Despite their wildly different backgrounds, both Roosevelt and Reagan possessed citizen 
compassion.  Roosevelt’s citizen compassion was the product of numerous lessons from his 
parents and instructors, while Reagan’s citizen compassion was in large part due to his days in 
the Midwest as a middle-class American.  Both individuals were deeply committed to improving 
the quality of life in the nation, and had a keen sense for public opinion.  Yet responding to the 
“average citizen” was surely more of a priority for Roosevelt, as evinced by his communication 
with the public through radio and letters.  Therefore, it seems fair to label Roosevelt as 
displaying citizen compassion in a more profound manner than Reagan. 
Lastly, in comparing the communication capabilities of Roosevelt and Reagan, no clear 
leader exists.  Roosevelt was a strong communicator and utilized a host of vehicles to express 
himself to his constituents, the public, and foreign leaders.  Yet Reagan was a master orator and 
possessed a unique ability to captivate even the most hostile audiences.  While I agree with the 
majority of scholars who consider Reagan the superior communicator of the Modern Era, it is 
necessary to acknowledge Roosevelt’s innovative approach to communicating with the public.  
By conducting his “Fireside Chats,” Roosevelt opened the presidency to the public in ways never 
before done.  Although Reagan was better at the more traditional forms of communication such 
as public speaking, Roosevelt’s innovative approach should not go unnoticed. 
  61 
Before concluding my discussion on Roosevelt and Reagan, it is necessary to discuss the 
situational component of each presidency and assess the impact of the situation on the 
presidency.  In the case of Roosevelt, some of his success must be attributed to the time during 
which he served.  Arriving in Washington during the midst of the Great Depression placed 
Roosevelt at, or near, the trough of a horrendous economic cycle.  Because of this, Roosevelt 
found himself in a position where nearly all of his political maneuvers offered improvements to 
the status quo. 
Like Roosevelt, Reagan was also the beneficiary of a particular situation.  While Reagan’s 
move from military might to diplomacy brought about a major shift in U.S – Soviet relations, 
Reagan was aided by the Soviet Union’s economic crisis.  Had the Soviet Union been able to 
sustain a massive military buildup without experiencing severe inflation, the cold war would 
have likely continued.  Since Reagan’s success was partially built upon his achievements with 
the Soviet Union, one must accept the possibility that Reagan’s success came, at least in part, as 
a result of the era in which he served.  
While I felt it necessary to compare Roosevelt’s qualities to Reagan’s, such a comparison 
does not yield significant results for Johnson and Nixon.  Clearly, as I stated throughout my 
sections on Johnson and Nixon, Johnson never displayed adaptive leadership whereas Nixon 
demonstrated adaptive leadership throughout his presidency.  Additionally, Nixon lacked citizen 
compassion and had flawed communication skills, whereas Johnson was fairly attuned to the 
public and was notorious for his powerful communication techniques.   
In regards to the situations that Johnson and Nixon faced, they played minimal roles in their 
demises.  With Nixon, there does not seem to be a particularly noteworthy episode that occurred 
during his era and had a significant impact on his presidency.  I exclude Watergate from my 
  62 
discussion of situations because it occurred due to Nixon’s own behaviors, unlike the Great 
Depression or the Cold War.  As for Johnson, I do not subscribe to the theory put forth by some 
scholars which states that Johnson’s presidency was doomed from the start due to his inheritance 
of the Vietnam conflict.  Much like Roosevelt, Johnson found himself in the midst of a difficult 
situation.  However, unlike Roosevelt, Johnson failed to act decisively and exhibit adaptive 
leadership.  Therefore, I believe Johnson’s botched presidency was his own doing, rather than 
the consequence of Vietnam.   
Lastly, it is appropriate to assess my variables after the completion of my research.  Adaptive 
leadership seems to weigh in more heavily on the success of presidents than I would have 
thought prior to conducting my research.  It seems nearly impossible for a president to be 
successful without possessing adaptive leadership.  I believe there are two reasons that may 
explain the significance of adaptive leadership.  First, it could be that I severely underestimated 
the importance of adaptive leadership in achieving success.  Conversely, the concept may be too 
broad and encompass a space where things other than adaptive leadership are occurring.  In 
future research, this term would require a more rigid definition. 
As for citizen compassion, in my initial research I may have overvalued this concept.  While 
successful presidents have demonstrated citizen compassion, the utility of the characteristic is 
minimal.  Beyond allowing for presidents to discern public opinion, and tailoring their platforms 
and policy agendas accordingly, citizen compassion does not produce success to the degree that I 
previously believed. 
My final variable, communication techniques and aptitudes, also requires some modification.  
In conducting my research I have come to understand that what I previously perceived as a single 
variable contains many distinct components, all of which deserve consideration.  While it can be 
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said that Reagan universally displayed impressive communication techniques and aptitude, 
classifying Nixon’s communication becomes more difficult.  Though Nixon was a poor public 
speaker and lacked interpersonal skills, he was a gifted writer capable of producing his own 
speeches.  In future research, this variable would need to be separated into distinct segments in 
order to evaluate the different areas of communication. 
Despite these minor issues, I feel that my argument is well supported.  In comparing 
successful presidents to unsuccessful presidents, I have demonstrated that my three qualities are 
a crucial part of the formula for success.  In doing so, I have also proven that the absence of these 
qualities has played a major role in the failure of certain presidents.           
 
 
 
